Who Could Be a Soviet KGB Agent?

Introduction:

Ever wonder what it takes to become an agent? A secret agent? Or spy?

My story doesn't revolve around Snow-White and the Seven Dwarves.

During a coffee break with a colleague from my branch, a stunning woman approached me and respectfully inquired if I was Mario.

I responded to her, advising her not to approach strangers in such a manner. On Monday, at precisely 8 a.m., I received an envelope from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Two years later, I received full membership in Directorate VII of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But let's travel back in time and explore how to become a KGB secret agent.

Who could potentially be a KGB agent, and what are the steps to become one?

Becoming a spy in the all-powerful Soviet secret service was not an effortless task.

The Soviet KGB actively sought out agents and workers, sometimes even without their will.

Who was employed by the KGB?

The KGB guaranteed benefits for its employees. The secret service employed a large number of individuals from a variety of backgrounds.

The KGB, a complex organisation with multiple directorates, each with its own area of responsibility, opened positions and filled them with individuals who possessed the necessary profile or specialisation.

The USSR's KGB was a big and sophisticated institution.

The First Main Intelligence Directorate's work differed substantially from the territorial counterintelligence administration.

There were numerous specialists fighting groups and technology teams.

There was also a military counterintelligence department, border soldiers with their own secret service, and the Directorate of Special Communications.

Party officials' security was the responsibility of the 7th and 9th departments.

Therefore, the KGB provided employment opportunities for a diverse range of individuals.

Recruits

Simultaneously, a strong and very discreet institution viewed unsolicited applications with suspicion.

KGB recruiters diligently searched colleges, the army, factories, and other places for potential candidates unaffiliated with the secret police.

Recruitment officers watched and evaluated prospective applicants in their surroundings.

Most of the time, future KGB officers were not aware that the secret service was considering them as potential agents.

Unintentional spies

KGB officers used a wide network of informants to accomplish their objectives.

The KGB frequently persuaded, or even coerced, both foreigners and Soviets.

The main targets for hiring KGB operatives stationed outside, particularly in Western nations, were those who had already attained a high position or special role in their country, or those who may do so in the future.

According to a secret KGB handbook, KGB agents concentrated their recruitment efforts mainly on organizations in charge of overseeing the nation's foreign policies, such as:

• Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
• the Cabinet of Ministers,
• Political party leadership centers, etc.

KGB agents particularly sought out people who were dissatisfied with their jobs or who already shared the Soviet Union's declared objectives and guiding ideals.

Recruits found universities all over the world to be a promising environment.

They will be useful to students as they advance in their careers.

Soviet nationals frequently unintentionally became informants and agents of the KGB.

Classic recruitment refers to a situation where an individual is aware of their recruitment. That person frequently signs a statement of engagement under a false identity.

We instruct that person on basic or sophisticated encryption methods, including cyphers, linkages, and passwords.

Agents who infiltrate terrorist organizations—drug cartels, gangs, etc.—need to be extremely skilled.

There are other documented instances where the KGB enlisted writers, painters, and athletes as members of the intelligentsia to cover dissidents in their community.

Potential recruits

The USSR might then invite potential recruits found overseas for further processing.

Without relationships with the leaders of the nation's political and civil society, diplomats and journalists with USSR accreditation could not advance in their careers.

This lays the groundwork for building relationships with foreigners, fostering their operational growth, and luring them to cooperate with intelligence.

Espionage is a covert profession by nature.

Therefore, if a potential recruit goes to the Soviet Union with a delegation, he should never be the delegation leader.

The delegation should also be large enough to give the target the greatest amount of anonymity possible.

Moscow will come to the target if he is unable to come to Moscow.

An agent already stationed in that nation may be activated, or an operator will be dispatched to visit under the pretense of a study program or professional meeting.

The process then produces a file known as the beginning study file. If the operation progresses to the next phase, we open the Operational Development File.

A number of operators from various KGB departments will oversee you.

Expulsion from the KGB

The KGB appears to have selected informants and agents at random. The State Security Committee physically brought the candidates out. Exclusion resulted from a negative reputation and certain physical traits.

Candidates who appeared unobtrusive were preferred.

The prevalence of nervous twitches, eyesight and squinting difficulties, speech problems, protruding teeth, and obvious birthmarks, among other visible physical deformities, has significantly decreased.

It was considered that such applicants could not consistently complete their tasks.

Additionally, the KGB prohibited members of specific ethnic groups from working there.

For example, KGB recruiters typically shunned Jews, Crimean Tatars, Karachays, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Greeks, Germans, Koreans, and Finns.

They were viewed as "unreliable."

In the USSR, racial discrimination was not a novel idea.